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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Defendant, Dale Carter Shackelford ("Shackelford"), appeals from his 
resentencing for two counts of first-degree murder in which he was given consecutive 
fixed life sentences. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Tue facts leading to Shackelford's convictions for first-degree murder (two 
counts), conspiracy to commit first-degree murder (two counts), first-degree arson, 
conspiracy to commit first-degree arson, and preparing false evidence were summarized 
by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 361-62, 247 P.3d 
582 (2010) (footnote omitted), as follows: 
Dale Shackelford was convicted of the murders of his ex-wife, 
Donna Fontaine, and her boyfriend, Fred Palahniuk, which occurred near 
the Latah County town of Kendrick, Idaho, in May 1999. The State 
alleged that Shackelford conspired with Martha Millar, Bernadette 
Lasater, Mary Abitz, Sonja Abitz, and, John Abitz. Millar and Lasater 
worked for Shackelford's trucking business, Shackelford Enterprises, in 
Missouri. The Abitz family lived near the residence where the bodies of 
Donna and Fred were found. Sonja Abitz was Shackelford's fiancee at the 
time of the murders, and John and Mary Abitz are Sonja's parents. The 
alleged conspirators eventually pled guilty to charges related to the 
murders. 
Shackelford and Donna married in Missouri in December 199 5 and 
the relationship ended in the summer of 1997, with the couple divorcing in 
November of that year. Donna accused Shackelford of raping her in July 
1997, and charges were filed in 1998. In the spring of 1999, Donna 
developed a relationship with Fred and, on May 28, 1999, the two visited 
Donna's brother, Gary Fontaine, at the home Gary and Donna's daughter 
owned together outside of Kendrick. The morning of May 29, Donna, 
Fred, and Gary went to the Locust Blossom Festival in Kendrick, where 
they met John, Mary, and Sonja Abitz. 
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After leaving the festival, Gary went to the Abitz's house, but he 
left around dark, returned home, noticed Donna's pickup in the driveway, 
and smelled smoke. Gary called the Abitz's house and reported that his 
two-story garage was on fire. Mary, Sonja, Ted Meske (Mary's brother), 
and Shackelford arrived at the fire and various individuals tried to 
extinguish it, but were unsuccessful. 
At 7:40 p.m., Latah County Sheriff Patrol Deputy Richard Skiles 
was called to investigate the fire at 2168 Three Bear Road. When Skiles 
arrived at the scene, nearly an hour later, he observed several persons -
including Gary Fontaine, Mary Abitz, Sonja Abitz, Brian Abitz (Sonja's 
brother), Ted Meske, and Shackelford - standing near the garage that was 
completely engulfed in flames. Based upon information obtained from 
Ted and Shackelford, Deputy Skiles contacted dispatch to have an on-call 
detective sent "because there was a possibility there could be a suicide 
victim in the fire." By the time the fire department arrived, the garage had 
been utterly destroyed. Several hours later, after the fire had been 
extinguished, two bodies were found in the rubble. The bodies were 
subsequently identified as the remains of Donna and Fred. At trial, a state 
fire investigator testified as to his opinion that the fire was arson. 
Doctor Robert Cihak conducted autopsies of the remains, which 
were severely burned. Shotgun pellets were found in Donna's right chest 
region and a bullet was found in the back of her neck. Dr. Cihak opined 
that the bullet wound was fatal and was inflicted when Donna was still 
alive. A bullet was also found in Fred's body behind the upper 
breastbone, which Dr. Cihak concluded was the cause of death. Dr. Cihak 
offered his opinion that Donna and Fred were dead at the time of the fire. 
On February 11, 2000, an Indictment was filed charging Shackelford with two 
counts of first-degree murder, first-degree arson, two counts of conspiracy to commit 
first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit arson, and preparing false evidence. (#27966, 
R., pp.1-4.)1 An Amended Indictment was subsequently filed charging Shackelford with 
a persistent violator sentencing enhancement in violation of LC. § 19-2514 because he 
had been previously convicted of five felonies, including sodomy, theft, burglary, 
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and possession of a stolen vehicle. (Id., pp.1517-
1 The state will refer to the records and transcripts by their respective Idaho Supreme 
Court numbers and to Shackelford's opening brief as "Brief." 
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22.) The Honorable John R. Stegner presided throughout the entirety of Shackelford's 
criminal case. (Id., pp.25-27, 3120-27.) At the conclusion of his trial, a jury found 
Shackelford guilty of all the charged offenses. (Id., pp.2223-31.) Because Shackelford 
was found guilty of crimes carrying a potential life sentence, the state moved to dismiss 
the persistent violator enhancement (id., pp.244-46), which was granted (id., pp.2290-91). 
After completion of post-trial motions and an extensive sentencing hearing, Judge 
Stegner found the state proved two statutory aggravating factors involving Donna's 
murder (id., pp.3094-3100) and one statutory aggravating factor involving Fred's murder 
(id., pp.3111-15), reviewed the mitigation evidence (id., pp.3084-91, 3100-07), weighed 
the collective mitigation against each individual statutory aggravator (id., pp.3100, 3115), 
and sentenced Shackelford to death for both murders (id., p.3122). As to the remaining 
crimes, Shackelford was given a fixed twenty-five years for first-degree arson, fixed life 
for one count of conspiracy to commit murder, a fixed twenty-five years for the second 
count of conspiracy to commit murder, and a fixed five years for preparing false 
evidence, all sentences to run concurrently with each other. (Id., pp.3123-25.) 
With the assistance of the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD"), 
Shackelford filed his initial post-conviction petition (#31928, R., pp.10-35), a third 
amended petition (id., pp.2534-2642), and an addendum to his third amended petition 
(id., pp.2980-90). Judge Stegner presided over Shackelford's post-conviction 
proceedings, including settlement of the record on appeal. (Id., pp.108-09, 3740-42; 
#27966/321928, Supp. R., pp.134-36). However, Shackelford moved to disqualify Judge 
Stegner because Shackelford named him as a party in a Writ of Mandate that involved the 
return of money seized at the time of Shackelford's arrest. (#31928, R., pp.126-44.) 
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After a hearing, Judge Stegner denied Shackelford's motion. (#31928, Tr., pp.22-29.) 
The issue was neither raised on appeal nor addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court. See 
Shackelford, supra. Judge Stegner ultimately granted Shackelford sentencing relief, 
concluding, based upon Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), that the jury was 
mandated to conduct the weighing process in death penalty cases and, therefore, ordering 
that Shackelford's death sentences be "set aside." (#31928, R., pp.3580-84.) Based upon 
the decision to provide Shackelford sentencing relief, Judge Stegner concluded three 
other sentencing claims were moot. (Id., pp.3628-29.) All of Shackelford's remaining 
guilt and sentencing claims were denied. (Id., pp.3569-3631.) 
Both the state and Shackelford appealed. (#31928, R., pp.3702-09.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court affirmed Shackelford's convictions, prison sentences, and the 
determination that Shackelford had to be resentenced for first-degree murder, albeit on 
different grounds, by concluding the jury did not find the statutory aggravating factors 
and the error was not harmless "because we cannot find beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
reasonable jury could find that the State proved that Donna and Fred were killed at the 
same time"; the court did not address whether Ring requires the jury to conduct the 
relevant weighing. Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 386-88. 
On remand, the state provided notice it would not seek the death penalty for 
Donna and Fred's murders. (#39398, R., pp.14-20.) Judge Stegner presided over the 
entirety of Shackelford's resentencing. (Id., pp.12, 144-48.) Shackelford moved to 
disqualify Judge Stegner for cause under I. C.R. 25(b )( 4 ), asserting that Judge Stegner' s 
presiding over the criminal proceedings of Shackelford' s co-defendants, presiding over 
Shackelford's post-conviction case, and statements Judge Stegner made "that the 
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Defendant manipulated, deceived, coerced and utilized other improper, illegal and 
immoral schemes to influence others including Co-Defendants to perform acts they 
would not otherwise perform," resulted in him being biased. (Id., pp. 72-77.) In his 
supporting brief (id., pp.64-71 ), Shackelford also raised a due process argument, 
contending Judge Stegner had "reviewed voluminous materials that are testimonial 
hearsay which have not been subjected to cross-examination." (Id., pp.66-67.) During 
the hearing regarding Shackelford's motion, his attorney clarified, "With respect to the 
Crawford case, I'd just like to state that we're not arguing about the admissibility of - of 
hearsay at sentencing, we are about the effect of that - that that hearsay may have with 
regard to the prejudice or biases - of the Court." (#39398, Tr., p.23.) Judge Stegner 
denied the motion expressly noting if he were biased or prejudiced he "wouldn't have 
vacated [Shackelford's] sentence of death in the two counts that he's back to be 
resentenced upon." (Id., p.26.) 
An updated presentence report ("updated PSI") was ordered (#39398, R., pp.34-
35), and Shackelford filed an objection to various portions of the presentence report 
prepared for his first sentencing and the updated PSI (id., pp.89-94); however, it does not 
appear Judge Stegner ruled on the objections. After the resentencing hearing (#39398, 
Tr., pp.31-75), Shackelford was sentenced to fixed life for each count of first-degree 
murder, to be served consecutively (#32398, R., pp.144-48). Judgment was filed on 




Shackelford has phrased the issues on appeal as follows: 
I. Whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to 
disqualify itself from sentencing Mr. Shackelford[.] 
II. Whether the district court erred in considering testimony not 
subject to confrontation and cross-examination in sentencing Mr. 
Shackelford[.] 
III. Whether the district court abused its discretion in considering 
victim impact evidence from a person who was not a victim of Mr. 
Shackelford's crimes[.] 
(Brief, p.6.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as follows: 
1. Has Shackelford failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion to disqualify based upon an allegation of bias stemming 
merely from the district court having presided over his prior trial, sentencing, and 
post-conviction proceedings and the criminal proceedings of his co-defendants? 
2. Because the district court did not rule on Shackelford's objections to the updated 
PSI and, alternatively, because the Confrontation Clause does not apply at 
sentencing, has Shackelford failed to establish error stemming from the inclusion 
of letters in the updated PSI or that the district court abused its discretion if the 
letters were considered? 
3. Because the district court did not rule on Shackelford's objections to the updated 
PSI and, alternatively because the district court is permitted to consider a broad 
range of evidence when imposing sentence, has Shackelford failed to establish 
error stemming from the inclusion of a letter from Susan Birrell or that the district 




Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Denying His Motion To Disqualify Based Upon Judicial Bias 
A. Introduction 
Shackelford contends the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
motion to disqualify under I.C.R. 25(b)(4) because of the "prior exposure to prejudicial, 
unreliable and inadmissible information about Mr. Shackelford and his case, by both 
presiding over Mr. Shackelford's 2001 capital sentencing, as well as the sentencings of 
Mr. Shackelford's co-defendants." (Brief, pp.7-8.) Specifically, Shackelford contends 
the following made it impossible for Judge Stegner to fairly and impartially sentence 
Shackelford: (1) presiding over the criminal proceedings of co-defendants Bernadette 
Lasater, Martha Millar, Mary Abitz, and Sonja Abitz; (2) acknowledging Sonya's 
statements following her arrest were "some of the most incriminating testimony against 
Mr. Shackelford even though the statement was not elicited at Mr. Shackelford's trial"; 
(3) presiding over Shackelford's first sentencing and the sentencings of his co-
defendants, which allegedly resulted in Judge Stegner forming the opinion that 
Shackelford "manipulated, deceived, and coerced others to commit acts they would not 
otherwise do"; (4) exposure to "numerous statements constituting testimonial hearsay that 
were not subject to cross-examination"; (5) being "privy to the confidential and 
privileged trial notes of defense counsel that were disclosed to the judge during post-
conviction proceedings for an in-camera determination of whether the notes should be 
provided to the State"; and (6) exposure to "impermissible and inflammatory victim 
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impact statements in the original PSI, including recommendations from Fred Palahniuk:'s 
brother and son that Mr. Shackelford be sentenced to death." (Brief, pp.9-10.) 
The district court denied Shackelford's motion to disqualify, explaining it should 
only be granted "if [the court] has actual prejudice against the defendant of such a nature 
to render it improbable that the Court could carry out the sentencing in a fair and 
impartial manner." (#39398, Tr., p.26.) The court further concluded, "I don't think that 
Crawford applies to sentencing," and if the "cumulative effect of the [sic] all of the 
information that I have received has prejudiced me against Mr. Shackelford ... I 
wouldn't have vacated his sentence of death." (Id.) While the court acknowledged 
ordering disclosure of various documents that were presented for in-camera review 
during post-conviction proceedings, the court explained, "I don't take it upon myself to 
read everything that has been disclosed to the State in this case" and "I've probably 
forgotten more about this case than I knew at one time." (Id., p.27.) 
Shackelford has failed to establish the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion to disqualify Judge Stegner for cause or that Shackelford was denied 
due process. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision on a motion to disqualify under I.C.R. 25 is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion, which requires the appellate court to decide "(1) whether the trial court 
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether the trial court acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards; and (3) 
whether the trial court reached its determination through an exercise of reason." State v. 
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Pratt, 128 Idaho 207, 211, 918 P.2d 94 (1996) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 
600, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989)). 
C. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish Judge Stegner Was Biased 
Under I.C.R. 25(b)(4), "Any party to an action may disqualify a judge or 
magistrate from presiding in any action [where] [t]hat judge or magistrate is biased or 
prejudiced for or against any party or that party's case in the action." Additionally, while 
"[i]t is axiomatic that '[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due 
process,"' Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 858, 876 (2009) (quoting In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)), "'most matters relating to judicial disqualification 
[do] not rise to the constitutional level,"' id. (quoting FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 
683, 702 (1948)). In Caperton, 556 U.S. at 880-81, the Court explained, "a conflict 
arising from [the judge's] participation in an earlier proceeding" can result in recusal, but 
"this rule rests on the relationship between the judge and the defendant." "The inquiry is 
an objective one. The Court asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, 
but whether the average judge in his position is 'likely' to be neutral, or whether there is 
an unconstitutional 'potential for bias."' Id. at 881. "In defining these standards the 
Court has asked whether, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and 
human weakness, the interest poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the 
practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately 
implemented." Id. at 883-84. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly addressed the issue of judicial bias, 
particularly in capital cases. In Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 203-06, 731 P.2d 192 
(1986), the supreme court addressed the question of whether the resentencing judge 
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should be disqualified because of ex parte information allegedly received prior to the 
defendant's first sentencing. While the supreme court directed the judge to disclose any 
information that could be recalled, the court further explained, "by directing him to 
disclose that factual information at the resentencing hearing, we are not suggesting Judge 
Newhouse should be automatically disqualified from presiding over the resentencing or 
any other subsequent proceedings in this case in the district court." Id. at 206. The court 
"completely reject[ed] Sivak's invitation to adopt a rule that would inevitably result in 
the disqualification of a sentencing judge from the post-conviction proceedings for the 
same defendant," id., and explained, "judges are capable of disregarding that which 
should be disregarded is a well accepted precept in our judicial system," id. at 205 
(quotations and citations omitted); see also Pizzuto v. State, 13 4 Idaho 793, 799, 10 P .3 d 
742 (2000). 
The issue of judicial bias was again raised during one of Sivak' s subsequent post-
conviction proceedings. Sivak v. State, 127 Idaho 3 87, 3 89 901 P .2d 494 (1995). The 
supreme court rejected Sivak's newest argument, explaining: 
We have held that when addressing a motion to disqualify brought under 
Criminal Rule 25, which was denied, the judge must recognize the case 
has been judged, that lasting opinions have been formed, and that the 
judge must determine if the proper legal analysis which the law requires 
can be performed. If the judge can make the proper legal analysis, then 
the motion to disqualify should be denied. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 107, 967 P.2d 702 
(1998). 
Sivak raised his judicial bias claim before the Ninth Circuit, contending, "Judge 
Newhouse made up his mind following the initial sentencing proceeding in 1981, he 
viewed subsequent resentencing hearings with contempt and felt an overwhelming need 
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to vindicate his initial ruling. Second, Judge Newhouse became embroiled in a running, 
bitter controversy with [Sivak] and his counsel, such that a detached observer must 
conclude that a fair and impartial hearing was unlikely." Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 
898, 923-24 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations and citation omitted). While recognizing 
the standard for judicial bias is "not entirely clear," the Ninth Circuit explained, "Sivak 
has failed to overcome the twin presumptions against finding actual bias: the state courts 
determined that Judge Newhouse was impartial, and, in any event, we presume that Judge 
Newhouse was impartial because he was a judicial officer." Id. at 924. The court noted 
that, despite having the opportunity to depose Judge Newhouse, "Sivak has failed to 
identify evidence of actual bias sufficient to overcome the presumptions against his 
claim." Id. at 925. The court explained: 
But even if a case has been reversed on appeal, it has long been regarded 
as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand 
and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant. While some 
may argue that a judge will feel the motivation to vindicate a prior 
conclusion when confronted with a question for the second or third time, 
for instance, upon trial after a remand, ... we accept the notion that the 
conscientious judge will, as far as possible, make himself aware of his 
biases of this character, and, by that very self-knowledge, nullify their 
effect. 
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
In State v. (Bryan) Lankford, 113 Idaho 688, 700, 747 P.2d 710 (1987), rev'd on 
other grounds by Lankford v. Idaho, 486 U.S. 1051 (1988), the defendant contended the 
district court erred during post-conviction proceedings by denying his motion to 
disqualify for prejudice because, in part, the court presided at the trial, ruled on various 
motions, made findings in assessing the death penalty that Lankford was not credible 
which would allegedly impact his ability to testify during post-conviction proceedings, 
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found the underlying offenses to be heinous, atrocious, and exhibit an utter disregard for 
human life, and had "attached an emotional commitment to the 'correctness' of his initial 
determination." The supreme court rejected his argument, concluding his "allegations of 
bias do not show any actual prejudice on the part of the judge directed toward Lankford 
of such a nature and character that it would have made it impossible for Lankford to get 
a fair post conviction hearing." Id. at 701. 
In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 215, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the court explained 
the parameters of motions to disqualify judges based upon bias and information gleaned 
from prior or other proceedings: 
Every trial judge who rules upon a post conv1ct10n review 
proceeding or an I.C.R. 35 motion to reduce sentence will previously have 
prejudged the matter, often forming extremely strong opinions as to the 
sentence which should be imposed, and will no doubt be convinced that 
the procedure followed and the sentence imposed was correct, particularly 
where the trial court proceedings have been affirmed on appeal by this 
Court. It would be an unusual case in which a trial judge, when called 
upon to rule on an I.C.R. 35 motion to reduce sentence, would not 
approach the case on the basis that the sentence imposed was correct, and 
require the defendant to shoulder "the burden of showing that the original 
sentence was unduly severe." State v. Martinez, 113 Idaho 535, 536, 746 
P.2d 994, 995 (1987). Coming to the case with that frame of mind does 
not constitute bias or prejudice within the meaning of I.C.R. 25(b)(4) and 
does not require disqualification of the trial judge. In this case the judge 
in question had presided at the trial of both Beam and Scoggins. He had 
heard all of the evidence regarding this brutal murder and raping of an 
innocent thirteen year old girl. He had presided at the sentencing 
proceedings in which extensive mitigation and aggravation evidence was 
presented to the court. Based upon all of that evidence, the trial court then 
arrived at the judgment that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the 
mitigating circumstances and sentenced both defendants to death. The 
death penalty is reserved for only the most heinous of first degree 
murders. The very nature of the sentencing process in capital cases 
requires a trial judge to form strong opinions and convictions that the 
defendant merits the most severe penalty. It would be extremely unlikely 
and no doubt improper for a trial court to impose a death penalty unless it 
had formed the strong opinion and belief that the defendant had no 
redeeming features, and that the circumstances of this particular case 
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justified the imposition of this most serious penalty known to the law. 
Accordingly, when a trial judge is called upon to rule upon a petition for 
post conviction relief, or a motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 
35, _particularly in a case where the death penalty has been imposed, he 
comes to the case after having already formed strong opinions and beliefs 
regarding the atrocious nature of the crime, the unredeemable character of 
the defendant, and the need of society to impose this most serious of 
criminal penalties. A trial judge is not required to erase from his mind all 
that has gone before, and indeed, it is doubtful that any human being 
could. Rather, when faced with an I.C.R. 25(b)(4) motion to disqualify for 
bias and prejudice in a post conviction or I.C.R. 35 proceeding, the trial 
judge need only conclude that he can properly perform the legal 
analysis which the law requires of him, recognizing that he has already 
pre-judged the case and has formed strong and lasting opinions regarding 
the worth of the defendant and the sentence that ought to be imposed to 
punish the defendant and protect society. 
(Emphasis added); see also State v. Jones, 146 Idaho 297, 298-99, 193 P.3d 457 (Ct. 
App. 2008). 
The question of whether the death penalty was imposed arbitrarily and under the 
influence of passion and prejudice was addressed in State v. (Mark) Lankford, 116 Idaho 
860, 875, 781P.2d197 (1989). The supreme court explained the analysis begins with the 
basic concept that "[t]he right to due process requires an impartial trial judge." Id. The 
court reiterated, "A judge may not be disqualified for prejudice unless it is shown that the 
prejudice is a prejudice that is directed against the party litigant, and is of such a nature 
and character as would render it improbable that the party could have a fair and impartial 
trial in the particular case pending." Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
Like the instant case, in State v. Pratt, 128 Idaho 208, 209-11, 912 P.2d 94 (1996), 
the defendant had to be resentenced after initially being sentenced to death, and raised the 
same issue being raised by Shackelford. The court rejected Pratt's claim of judicial bias, 
explaining he failed to "offer any specific proof of prejudice" and "[i]t does not appear 
from the record that the trial judge abused his discretion in determining at resentencing 
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that he could sit fairly and impartially and perform the proper legal analysis which the 
law requires to be performed." Id. at 210-11 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 2 
The Ninth Circuit has further discussed the issue of judicial bias stemming from 
an Idaho capital case where the petitioner contended the trial judge's presiding over his 
co-defendant's case not only constituted actual bias, but the appearance of bias. Paradis 
v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950, 958 (9th Cir. 1994). The court rejected this argument, explaining, 
"Paradis' entire argument is based upon the mistaken notion that a trial judge's exposure 
to evidence, standing alone, demonstrates bias." Id. 
As explained in Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(internal quotations and citations omitted), " The fact that the trial judge in the original 
trial was also the trial judge in the second trial is insufficient to establish bias and 
2 As recognized in State v. Elliott, 126 Idaho 323, 329 n.1, 882 P.2d 978 (Ct. App. 1994), 
the Idaho Supreme Court has used "impossible" and "improbable" when discussing the 
question of whether the litigant gets a fair trial. While the court of appeals resolved the 
conflict in favor of the "improbable" standard, the Idaho Supreme Court has continued to 
use the "impossible" standard. Pizzuto, 134 Idaho at 799. Moreover, as recognized in 
Roe v. Doe, 142 Idaho 174, 177-78, 125 P.3d 530 (2005) (quoting Desfosses v. 
Desfosses, 120 Idaho 27, 29, 813 P.2d 366 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting United States v. 
Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966)), the United States Supreme Court has utilized the 
"impossible" standard, explaining that to warrant the disqualification of a judge for 
alleged bias, the bias must either be based on information "other than what the judge 
learned from his participation in the case" or be "of such a nature and character that it 
would make it impossible for the litigant to get a fair trial." However, in Idaho Dept. of 
Health and Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 752, 764, 250 P.3d 803 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 
Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 791-92, 229 P.3d 1146 (2010)), the court of appeals 
opined the Idaho Supreme Court "implicitly overruled the prior Idaho cases" and held 
"that whatever the source of the bias or prejudice, it must be 'so extreme as to display 
clear inability to render fair judgment,' that 'unless there is a demonstration of 'pervasive 
bias' derived either from the extrajudicial source or facts and events occurring at trial, 
there is no basis for judicial recusal. "' Irrespective of whether the standard is 
"improbable," "impossible," or "clear inability to render fair judgment," Shackelford has 
failed to meet his burden of establishing that mere exposure to evidence from his prior 
trial, sentencing, post-conviction proceedings, or proceedings involving his co-defendants 
constitutes sufficient evidence of judicial bias or prejudice that warrants recusal under 
I.C.R. 25(b)(4) or due process. 
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prejudice. It has long been regarded as normal and proper for a judge to sit in the same 
case upon its remand and to sit in successive trials involving the same defendant." See 
also Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 1996) (trial judge is not required to 
recuse himself when subsequently sentencing defendant on retrial in a capital case). 
Shackelford's argument can be synopsized into his attorney's statement at the 
hearing regarding his motion to disqualify for cause, when counsel explained, "We're 
simply contending that due to the saturation effect through the Court's exposure to all of 
the information, documents, and statements that the Court has seen and heard in this and 
related cases, that it would appear that bias or prejudice could be the result of that 
saturation effect." (#39398, Tr. p.24.) However, as detailed above, mere exposure to 
additional information from a defendant, co-defendant, or some extra-judicial source, 
simply does not rise to the level of bias for purposes of I.C.R. 25(b )( 4) or due process. 
Moreover, Shackelford's reliance upon State v. (Bryan) Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 
903 P .2d 1305 (1995), is sorely misplaced. Lankford did not involve a claim of judicial 
bias, but an allegation that the state violated a plea agreement, and that Santobello v. New 
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), mandated resentencing before a different judge. Lankford, 
127 Idaho at 615-16. Although the supreme court distinguished Santobello because 
breach of the plea agreement was discovered prior to the first resentencing, Lankford, at 
616, the court nevertheless concluded, "so there can be no suggestion that the sentence 
ultimately imposed on remand, whatever it may be, is in any way a product of the 
residual effects of the state's submission of aggravating evidence and arguments, 
resentencing shall be by a judge who has not heard the evidence or arguments" id. at 618. 
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In Pratt, 128 Idaho at 210 (internal quotations and citations omitted), the supreme court 
readily distinguished Lankford, explaining: 
Notably, however, the Court there explicitly stated that it did not base 
disqualification on ex parte communications that occurred between the 
judge and a prosecution witness. As in this case, there was no evidence in 
the record indicating that the sentencing judge received the type of 
information that would serve to bias the judge. Pratt's claim of bias, like 
Lankford' s, thus lacks support in fact and runs contrary to common 
experience. 
Shackelford's case is clearly not governed by Lankford, but is governed by the 
cases detailed above, which are conspicuously ignored by Shackelford. There is simply 
no basis for a finding of bias or prejudice based merely upon Judge Stegner having "prior 
knowledge of the sought punishment, the evidence [he] found to support the sought 
punishment and [his] actual imposition of death." (Brief, p.13.) 
IL 
Shackelford's Claim Regarding The Confrontation Clause Fails Because There Is No 
Adverse Ruling And The Confrontation Clause Does Not Apply At Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
Shackelford initially contends the district court erred by considering the 
statements of Madison County assistant prosecutor R. Scott Killeen, Bernadette Lasater, 
and Martha Millar, which were attached to the updated PSI, because the statements were 
allegedly "testimonial" and violated Shackelford's Sixth Amendment right to confront 
witnesses. (Brief, p.14.) Shackelford subsequently expands his claim to include a 
statement of Sonja Abitz. (Brief, pp.35, 38.) 
Because the district court never ruled on Shackelford's Objections and Response 
to Presentence Investigation, there is no adverse opinion from which he can appeal. 
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Moreover, while the updated PSI contains letters from Killeen, Lasater, and Millar, 
because there are no letters from Abitz, Shackelford's expansion of the claim to include 
letters from her is without merit. Irrespective, because the Confrontation Clause does not 
apply to sentencing, Shackelford has failed to establish any error even if the letters were 
considered by the district court. Finally, even if the Confrontation Clause applies to 
sentencing hearings, any alleged error was harmless. 
B. There Is No Adverse Ruling From Which Shackelford Can Appeal 
While Shackelford undoubtedly filed a motion objecting to the letters from 
Killeen, Lasater, and Millar, which were attached to the updated PSI, he did not object to 
any letters from Abitz (#39398, Tr., pp.89-94) because none exits (see updated PSI and 
addendum to the updated PSI). Moreover, as conceded by Shackelford (Brief, p.3 
("Neither the State nor the court addressed Mr. Shackelford's objections to the PSI and 
UPSI prior to sentencing")), the district court never addressed his objections. 
It is a fundamental tenet of appellate practice that the appellate courts "will not 
'review a trial court's alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse 
ruling which forms the basis for the assignment of error."' State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 
378, 384, 987 P.2d 290 (1999) (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 485, 849 P.2d 942 
(1993)); see also State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155 (Ct. App. 2008) 
("It is the appellant's burden to obtain a ruling on his motion"). Moreover, the appellate 
court "does not assume error on appeal; rather, the party assigning error must affirmative 
show it." Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Const., Inc., 144 Idaho 171, 173, 158 P.3d 947 
(2007) (citations rnitted). 
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Because the district court never ruled on Shackelford's objections to the 
presentence report, updated PSI, or the addendum and this Court cannot assume the 
district court relied on the information to which he objected, this Court cannot address the 
merits of Shackelford' s argument. 
C. Standard Of Review 
The Idaho Supreme Court detailed the standard of review for Confrontation 
Clause claims in Shackelford, 24 7 P .3d at 599 (citation omitted), as follows: 
When a violation of a constitutional right is asserted, this Court 
will give deference to the trial court's factual findings unless those 
findings are clearly erroneous. However we exercise free review over the 
trial court's determination as to whether constitutional requirements have 
been satisfied in light of the facts found. Whether the admission of [the 
letters] violated Shackelford's right to confront witnesses under the Sixth 
Amendment is a question of law over which the Court exercises free 
review. 
D. The Confrontation Clause Does Not Apply At Sentencing 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides, "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him." Prior to Shackelford's resentencing, the Supreme Court abandoned its prior 
Confrontation Clause analysis from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 46 (1980), and concluded 
the Clause bars "admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at 
trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity 
for cross-examination." Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54 (2004). 
Idaho's courts have repeatedly rejected the contention that the Confrontation 
Clause applies at sentencing, including those involving the death penalty. "The rationale 
for this rule is, in part, 'the belief that modem penological policies, which favor 
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sentencing based upon the maximum amount of information about the defendant, would 
be thwarted by restrictive procedural and evidentiary rules."' State v. Guerrero, 130 
Idaho 311, 312, 940 P .2d 419 (Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 
216, 731P.2d192 (1986)); see also State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 10, 966 P.2d 1 (1998) 
(reaffirming Sivak, 112 Idaho at 216). Moreover, this principle has not changed with the 
advent of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, (2002), or Crawford, supra. Indeed, not only 
has Shackelford ignored the binding precedent above, he has failed to cite any 
jurisdiction that has concluded the Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing because of 
Ring or Crawford. Rather, it appears Shackelford, based upon the "plain language" of 
the Sixth Amendment "considered in light of the history surrounding its ratification" 
(Brief, p.15), contends the Confrontation Clause has always applied at sentencing (id., 
pp.14-38). However, Shackelford's argument was rebuffed in State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 
930, 941 (Ariz. 2006), where the court recognized, "Just as '[t]he constitution's text does 
not alone resolve' to what extent statements not subjected to cross examination may be 
admitted during the trial, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42, 124 S.Ct. 1354, the Constitution's 
text does not alone resolve whether the right to confront adverse witnesses extends to 
sentencing hearings." Rather, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized the Supreme Court 
applied a "historical analysis similar to that employed later by the Court in Crawford," 
recognizing out-of-court affidavits were used frequently during sentencing '"both before 
and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and England 
practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the 
sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of 
punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law."' Id. (quoting Williams v. New 
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York, 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949)). The court reasoned, "In accord with its historical 
review and analysis, the Williams Court concluded that the right to confront adverse 
witnesses has never applied to sentencing. In the more than fifty years since it decided 
Williams, the Supreme Court has never suggested otherwise." Id. 
However, even if Shackelford contended Ring or Crawford changed the analysis, 
such an argument would be misguided. As explained in United States v. Littles!!!!, 444 
F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006) (quotes and citation omitted), the Ninth Circuit, relying 
upon Williams, 337 U.S. 241, concluded, "the law on hearsay at sentencing is still what it 
was before Crawford; hearsay is admissible at sentencing, so long as it is accompanied 
by some minimal indicia of reliability." See also Rodgers v. State, 948 So.2d 655, 674-
75 (Fla. 2006) (Cantero, J., concurring) (collecting federal appellate cases denying 
Confrontation Clause rights at sentencing); Summers v. State, 148 F.3d 778, 783 n.16 
(Nev. 2006) (same); McGill, 140 P.3d at 942 n.7 (Ariz. 2006) (citing federal and state 
appellate cases denying Confrontation Clause rights at sentencing). 
Shackelford has failed to establish the Confrontation Clause applies at a 
resentencing, particularly a non-capital resentencing. Therefore, he has failed to establish 
the district court erred even if the court had overruled Shackelford's objection to the 
letters from Killeen, Lasater, and Millar. 
E. Any Alleged Error Was Harmless 
Assuming this Court addresses the merits of Shackelford's claim, any alleged 
error was harmless. "Typically, under the harmless error test, once the defendant shows 
that a constitutional violation occurred, the State has the burden of demonstrating beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict." State v. 
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Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, ---, 272 P.3d 417, 444 (2012). "Whether an error is harmless in 
a particular case depends upon a host of factors, including the importance of the witness' 
testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence 
or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on 
material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the 
overall strength of the prosecution's case." State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 146, 176 
P Jd 911 (2007). "Idaho courts applied the harmless error test to Confrontation Clause 
violations prior to Crawford" and "[t]here is no reason to assume the harmless error test 
would not apply post-Crawford." Id. 
In Shackelford's resentencing, there is no possibility the statements contributed to 
his fixed life sentences for first-degree murder. Discussing the imposition of sentence, 
the district court referenced the prior imposition of the death penalty, stating, "But having 
found that the ultimate sanction was, or could have been appropriate for the crimes that 
you committed, I don't think it should come as any surprise that I'm imposing fixed life 
sentences for the murders of Donna Fontaine and Fred Palahniuk." (#39398, Tr., p.74.) 
In other words, the district court was not relying upon new information contained in the 
updated PSI or the addendum, but the evidence supporting its prior findings regarding 
imposition of the death penalty. Because the letters were not part of that evidence, there 
is no possibility they contributed to the court's imposition of consecutive fixed life 
sentences for first-degree murder. The court further explained, "You are very bright. 
You are very charming. But you used your intelligence and your charm in, as I 
characterized before, unspeakable ways, and I therefore think that the fixed life 
sentence is the appropriate sentence for you." (Id.) (emphasis added). 
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Moreover, the district court had already imposed a fixed life sentence for Count 
IV, conspiracy to commit murder, without the letters Shackelford now challenges that 
were not available until the resentencing. (R., #27966, pp.3123-24.) Therefore, the 
information contained within the letters was unnecessary and not considered by the 
district court when imposing consecutive fixed life sentences for the underlying first-
degree murders of Donna and Fred. 
Because the state has established beyond a reasonable doubt that any alleged 
violation of the Confrontation Clause did not contribute to the district court's imposition 
of consecutive fixed life sentences for the first-degree murders of Donna and Fred, any 
alleged error was harmless. 
III. 
Shackelford's Claim Regarding The Letter Of Suzanne Birrell Fails Because There Is No 
Adverse Ruling 
A. Introduction 
Shackelford contends the district court abused its discretion by "admitting and 
considering" the letter of Suzanne Birrell, which was attached to the updated PSI, 
because she was "neither Mr. Shackelford's victim nor an immediate family member of 
his victims." (Brief, p.39.) 
Because the district court never ruled on Shackelford's Objections and Response 
to Presentence Investigation, there is no adverse opinion from which he can appeal. 
Moreover, because of the broad nature of the district court's discretion in admitting 
evidence at sentencing, coupled with the desire to obtain the maximum amount of 
information about defendants prior to imposing a sentence, Shackelford has failed to 
22 
establish the district court abused its discretion even if Birrell's letter was considered. 
Finally, even if the letter was erroneously considered, any alleged error was harmless. 
B. There Is No Adverse Ruling From Which Shackelford Can Appeal 
Like his claim regarding the Confrontation Clause, Shackelford's claim regarding 
Birrell's letter is based upon the Defendant's Objection and Response to Presentence 
Investigation where he objected to the letter. (#39389, R., p.90.) However, just like the 
Confrontation Clause claim in section II(B) above, Shackelford never obtained a ruling 
from the district court. Because Shackelford failed to meet his burden of obtaining a 
ruling on his objection, Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 586, and this Court does not assume 
error, Fritts, 144 Idaho at 173, this Court cannot address the merits of his claim. 
C. Standard Of Review 
The admission of evidence at sentencing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, 
requiring the appellate court to decide "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived 
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of 
such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 174, 90 P.3d 920 (Ct. App. 2004). 
D. Shackelford Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
Shackelford's reliance upon LC. § 19-5306 and State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 
575, 199 P.3d 123 (2008), is misplaced because Birrell's letter was not admitted as a 
victim impact statement. While Shackelford correctly notes the district court inquired 
whether any victims or family members "would like to make statements at this time" 
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(#39398, Tr., pp.36-37), the prosecutor explained, "there are none present, Your Honor. 
The State would refer the Court back to the sentencing, where there was that type of 
information offered to the Court. And also in the updated presentence, there is a new 
letter from Dawn [sic] Fontaine's daughter that I actually believe was submitted after the 
presentence itself was filed" (id., p.37). The prosecutor subsequently affirmed the "new 
letter" was from Shanna Rathman, and that the state had "nothing other than that 
specifically on behalf of the victims." (Id.) There was never any mention that Birrell's 
letter was a "victim impact statement." Rather, the prosecutor utilized Birrell's letter to 
emphasize Shackelford's dangerousness and fear that if he is ever released from prison he 
will kill others that were involved in securing his convictions. (Id., p.69.) 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has discussed the broad range of information that 
may be considered at sentencing, explaining: 
After a criminal defendant's guilt has been established, the trial court has 
greater latitude regarding the information that it may consider for 
sentencing than could have been considered while the state was attempting 
to establish that guilt at trial. The trial court, therefore, has broad 
discretion in the admission of evidence at a sentencing proceeding and 
properly may consider a wide range of relevant evidence in determining 
an appropriate sentence for the particular defendant before it. Moreover, it 
is essential that the trial court receive all information available about the 
defendant before imposing sentence so that such sentence will reflect the 
character and propensity of the defendant as well as the circumstances of 
the offense. 
State v. Hoover, 138 Idaho 414, 422, 64 P.3d 340 (Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted). 
In State v. Jeppson, 138 Idaho 71, 75, 57 P.3d 782 (Ct. App. 2002), abrogated on 
other grounds, Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg. Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 895 265 P.3d 
502 (20 I I), the magistrate considered not only the letter of the victim, but the letters of 
her three children. Recognizing the trial court has broad discretion in determining what 
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evidence may be admitted at sentencing and that the judge is "presumably able to 
ascertain the relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and material 
presented to it during the sentencing process and to disregard the irrelevant and 
unreliable," the court of appeals concluded the three letters were "admissible at a 
sentencing hearing as long as the defendant is given an opportunity to challenge the 
reliability of the hearsay and to explain or rebut it." Id. at 75-76. Likewise, in State v. 
Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 851 P.2d 336 (Ct. App. 1993), the court of appeals concluded 
the district court did not error in permitting the victim's family to testify at the sentencing 
hearing, which included testimony concerning their opinion of the defendant, sentencing, 
and the years taken away from the actual victim's life. 
The underlying basis for this broad range of admissible evidence at sentencing is 
premised "on the belief that modem penological policies, which favor sentencing based 
on the maximum amount of information about the defendant, would be thwarted by 
restrictive procedural and evidentiary rules." Sivak, 112 Idaho at 215 (citing Williams, 
337 U.S. at 246-50). Indeed, based upon Williams, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
explained, "A sentencing judge may properly conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely 
unlimited, either as to the kind of information he may consider or the source from which 
it may come." State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 470, 816 P.2d 1023 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Obviously, information that Shackelford threatened to murder others is relevant 
information the district court should consider in determining future dangerousness. 
Moreover, Shackelford had "an opportunity to examine all information presented to the 
court at sentencing, to present favorable evidence, and to explain or rebut adverse 
evidence." State v. Martin, 142 Idaho 58, 60, 122 P.3d 317 (Ct. App. 2005); see also 
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State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 760, 810 P.2d 680 (1991) ("To ensure reliability, the 
defendant must be afforded the opportunity to present favorable evidence, to examine all 
materials contained in the presentence report, and to explain and rebut adverse 
evidence"). 
Even if Birrell's letter was considered, Shackelford has failed to establish the 
district court abused its discretion, requiring that his sentences for first-degree murder be 
affirmed. 
E. Any Alleged Error Was Harmless 
Assuming this Court addresses the merits of Shackelford's claim, for all of the 
reasons detailed in section II(E) above, any alleged error was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that Shackelford's consecutive fixed life sentences 
for the first-degree murders of Donna and Fred be affirmed. 
DATED this 14th day of August, 2012. 
Deputy Attorney - eneral 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
26 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of August, 2012, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by causing a file stamped copy addressed to: 
SHANNON N. ROMERO 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
27 
